This study examines whether changing the reporting location of OCI from the Statement of Changes in Equity (SSE) to a combined Income Statement or a separate Statement of Comprehensive Income (SCI), as required by Accounting Standard Update (ASU) 2011-05, has affected the value relevance of OCI. Using manually collected data, we find that the value relevance of OCI decreased for firms that changed the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI when compared to firms that did not change the reporting location. We also find that the market prices aggregate OCI only when it is reported in the SSE in both the pre ASU 2011ASU -05 (1998ASU -2006 and the adoption (2010-2012) periods. Our results are robust and generally consistent with Chambers et al. (2007) in that investors price OCI only when it is reported in the SSE. Given the recent regulatory efforts to increase the prominence of OCI, our findings should be of interest to accounting standard setters, researchers, and practitioners. Using manually collected data, we find that the value relevance of OCI decreased for firms that changed the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI when compared to firms that did not change the reporting location. We also find that the market prices aggregate OCI only when it is reported in the SSE in both the pre ASU 2011ASU -05 (1998ASU -2006 and the adoption (2010-2012) periods. Our results are robust and generally consistent with Chambers et al. (2007) in that investors price OCI only when it is reported in the SSE. Given the recent regulatory efforts to increase the prominence of OCI, our findings should be of interest to accounting standard setters, researchers, and practitioners.
Introduction

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 130 (SFAS 130) requires US
firms to report other comprehensive income (OCI) and its components 1 in either: (1) a combined income statement that reports both the components and totals of net income and comprehensive income; (2) a separate comprehensive income statement that starts with net income, reports the components of OCI, and ends with comprehensive income (SCI); 2 or (3) the statement of changes in equity (SSE). Accounting Standard Update No.
2011-05 (ASU 2011-05) eliminates the option to present OCI in the SSE and requires US firms to report OCI only in the SCI. Many accounting researchers (Elliott et al., 2010; Hunton et al., 2006; Maines and McDaniel, 2000; Hirst and Hopkins, 1998 ) and the accounting standard setters such as FASB and IASB believe that SCI is a more prominent, and thus more transparent, reporting location of OCI than SSE. This study examines whether changing the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI after the introduction of ASU 2011-05 has increased the value relevance of OCI.
Prior research on how financial statement presentation affects the way investors use the information contained in OCI has yielded mixed results (Rees and Shane, 2012) .
On the one hand, Hirst and Hopkins (1998) find that analysts are better able to detect earnings management and their valuation judgments are less influenced by the presence 1 The main components include unrealized gains or losses from foreign currency translation, available-forsale securities, derivative securities and hedging activities, and accrued pension liabilities. 2 This study uses SCI throughout the paper to refer to firms reporting OCI in a combined income statement or a separate statement of comprehensive income, although a majority of these firms reported OCI in a separate statement of comprehensive income during our test periods.
of earnings management when firms report OCI in a performance statement 3 as opposed to in the SSE. Hunton et al. (2006) find that managers are less likely to manage earnings when OCI is reported in a performance statement. These behavioral studies suggest that when OCI is reported in the SCI, it is more transparent to investors, thus lending support to the FASB's recent decision to eliminate the option of reporting in the SSE. On the other hand, using archival data, Chambers et al. (2007) find that investors price aggregate OCI only when it is reported in the SSE. Given that the SSE is the predominant location for reporting OCI during the 1998-2003 period, 4 they argue that investors are better able to use the information contained in OCI when firms report OCI in the SSE, a location investors are more familiar with. Rees and Shane (2012, p.808) remark that the findings in Chambers et al. (2007) may potentially be due to a small performance statement sample size (around 20% of the sample firms) and/or a self-selection bias. Our study aims to address the underlying issue and provide further evidence on the value relevance of OCI using an extended and more recent dataset. Moreover, as many US firms moved OCI from SSE to SCI after the introduction of ASU 2011-05, ASU 2011-05 provides a natural test setting to investigate the effect of not only the prominence of reporting location but also the change of the reporting location on the value allowance of OCI and its components. This study also provides timely feedback for the new and controversial reporting standard on comprehensive income.
We conduct two sets of analyses. First, we obtain data from 1998 (pre-ASU 2011 -05 period) and 2010 -2012 (the adoption period of ASU 2011 . Using the 1998-3 A combined income statement is equivalent to the statement of financial performance, which is the term used in IAS 1. 4 Chambers et al. (2007) document that about 80% of US firms reported OCI in the SSE during the period.
2006 data, we find that aggregate OCI is priced by investors only when reported in the SSE. We also find that OCI components, such as adjustments for foreign currency translation, available-for-sale investments, and pension liabilities, are more value relevant when reported in the SSE. These pre-ASU 2011-05 period results are consistent with Chambers et al.'s (2007) conclusion that investors pay more attention to items reported in a predominant and familiar location. Using the 2010-2012 data, we find that investors continue to price OCI only when it is reported in the SSE. In other words, reporting OCI in the SCI as required by ASU 2011-05 does not appear to have changed how investors value OCI. This is surprising because compared to the sample for earlier years, the sample for 2010-2012 contains a more balanced representation of firms reporting OCI in each location, allowing us to examine whether the predominant reporting of OCI in the SSE 5 has driven the results of prior studies. The above findings are robust even after we control for the potential of self-selection bias as suggested by Bamber et al. (2010) and Rees and Shane (2012) .
Second, we use the 2010-2012 sample to investigate whether changing the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI affects its value relevance. 6 If reporting OCI and its components in the SCI indeed makes information more transparent, as suggested by prior experimental research and FASB and IASB, one should observe an increase in the value relevance of OCI after the adoption of ASU 2011-05. Using a difference-indifferences test, we find that firms whose reporting location of OCI changed from SSE to SCI during 2010-2012 experienced a decrease in the value relevance of OCI relative to firms that did not change the reporting location. These results are consistent with our 5 Approximately 40% of our sample reported OCI in the SCI compared to 20% in Chambers et al. (2007) . 6 We did not include the 2013 data for the lack of variation as firms all reported OCI in SCI in 2013.
earlier finding, but inconsistent with prior experimental research findings (Hirst and Hopkins, 1998; Hunton et al., 2006) and the belief of FASB and IASB in that users of financial statements can better perceive the information contained in OCI when it is reported in the SCI.
In an additional analysis, we follow Elliott et al. (2010) to examine whether investor base and reporting location jointly affect the value relevance of OCI. Prior research finds that transient investors have a shorter-term horizon and are more likely to adjust their trading strategies based on near-term factors (Bushee, 2001; Elliott et al., 2010) . Elliott et al. (2010) find that financial analysts expect transient investors to respond to OCI only when it is reported more transparently in the SCI. However, we find that OCI is more value relevant in the SSE when a firm has most transient investors,
indicating that transient investors value OCI only when it is reported in a location they are more familiar with. This finding is inconsistent with the finding of Elliott et al. (2010) but consistent with our earlier findings.
Overall, we find that the value relevance of OCI decreased for firms that changed the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI when compared to firms that did not change the reporting location in the adoption period of ASU 2011-05. Further, the markets value OCI and its components only when they are reported in the SSE during the adoption period. Although reporting OCI in the SCI may increase information transparency and reduce managerial opportunistic behavior, it does not appear to have enhanced the value relevance of OCI, which primarily consists of highly volatile and transitory unrealized gains and losses caused by market fluctuations. Given the recent regulatory efforts to increase the prominence of OCI, our findings should be of interest to accounting standard setters, researchers, and practitioners.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews prior literature. Section 3 describes data and sample selection criteria. Section 4 discusses the research design. Section 5 reports the empirical results and the final section concludes.
Prior Literature
Previous archival studies have largely focused on the value relevance and predictive ability of comprehensive income (CI) and OCI. Using 1994 and 1995 data, Dhaliwal et al. (1999) investigate the relative usefulness of CI and the accounting income reported in the income statement (NI) for investors. They find that both NI and CI are value relevant, and OCI provides incremental explanatory power for returns beyond NI.
They also find that the explanatory power for stock returns (and for future NI and future operating cash flows) of CI is smaller than that of NI. In other words, investors price CI and OCI, but NI is a better performance indicator to predict stock returns, future NI, and future operating cash flows (CFO) than CI. Dhaliwal et al. (1999) As Rees and Shane (2012) point out, the findings of Chambers et al. (2007) contradict those of previous studies using an experimental approach. Using buy-side analysts and manipulating whether a company manages its earnings through the available-for-sale marketable securities, Hirst and Hopkins (1998) find that analysts can better detect earnings management when OCI is reported in the SCI. Using nonprofessional investors and three presentation formats, including disclosing OCI in a footnote, the SSE and a performance statement, Maines and McDaniel (2000) find that investors consider the volatility of OCI only when OCI is reported in a performance statement. Maines and McDaniel (2000) conclude that the reporting format affects how investors weigh OCI.
Presentation prominence of OCI also affects managers' other financial reporting decisions. Hunton et al. (2006) find that managers are less likely to manage earnings when OCI is reported in a performance statement. Lee et al. (2006) 
Data and Sample
Our sample consists of S&P 500 firms in the periods of 1998-2006, the pre-ASU 2011-05 period, and 2010-2012, the adoption period of ASU 2011-05. We manually collected the reporting location of OCI and its components for sample firms from their 10-K filings. Sample firms' financial data were obtained from the Compustat database, and stock prices and returns were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We follow Chambers et al. (2007) and employ the diagnostics of Belsley, Kuh, and Welch (1980) to remove potential outliers. 
Research Design
The effect of the reporting location of OCI on its value relevance
To validate our data for the period 1998-2006, we follow Chambers et al. (2007) to estimate the association between OCI and stock returns conditional on the reporting location of OCI using the following model:
where RET is the buy-and-hold raw return for the window eight months before to four months after the fiscal year end; NI is the net income after extraordinary items and discontinued operations; LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm reports net loss, and 0 otherwise; OCI is the value reported as other comprehensive income in the financial statements; DSE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when OCI is reported in the SSE, and 0 otherwise; DIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when OCI is reported in the SCI, and 0 otherwise; the subscript it denotes firm i in year t.
The variable definitions are summarized in Appendix A. Coefficients α 3 and α 4 in model
(1) capture the markets' pricing of OCI when it is reported in the SSE and the SCI, respectively. A statistically significant coefficient α 3 (α 4 ) indicates that OCI is value relevant when reported in the SSE (SCI).
Next, we examine whether the reporting location affects the pricing of each of the OCI components. We estimate the following model, decomposing OCI into its components: 
Controlling for self-selection of reporting location
Because firms had the choice of reporting OCI in the SSE or SCI prior to ASU 2011-05, results from OLS regressions may be subject to potential selection bias. To address this concern, we extend Chambers et al. (2007) by performing the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure using the sample for 1998-2006. In the first stage, we model the determinants of reporting location using the variables similar to Bamber et al. (2010) .
Specifically, we estimate the following probit regression that models the determinants of the choice over the reporting location of OCI and its components: 
where DIS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm presents OCI in the SCI, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is firm size, measured as the log of the market value of the firm's common shares outstanding; ROA is net income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets; LEVE is leverage, calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets;
VOL_OCI is the volatility of OCI relative to the volatility of NI, calculated as the standard deviation of comprehensive income after it has been scaled by total assets, divided by the standard deviation of net income after it has been scaled by total assets, over the initial comprehensive income reporting year and the prior four years;
Complexity_OCI captures the complexity of OCI, defined as the number of OCI components the firm reports on its 10-K filing; Abs_TCurrency_OCI (Abs_TAFS_OCI, 
where all variables in models (4) and (5) are as previously defined.
The effect of changing the reporting location of OCI and its components on their value relevance
During 2010-2012, many firms moved OCI from SSE to SCI upon the adoption of ASU 2011-05. We identify firms that switched the reporting location of OCI as the treatment firms, and the firms that continued to report OCI in the SCI throughout the three-year period as the control firms. There are 1,052 observations, with 871 firm-year observations in the treatment group and 181 firm-year observations in the control group.
We then perform a difference-in-differences regression to examine whether the change of reporting location affects the pricing of OCI and its components using the following models: 
where TREAT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm changed the presentation of OCI from SSE to SCI, and 0 if the firm continued to report OCI in the SCI. POST is an indicator variable: for the treatment firms, it takes the value of 1 after the firm changed the reporting location, and 0 for the period before the switch; for the All the independent (financial) variables in models (1) through (7) are scaled by the market value of common shares outstanding at eight months before fiscal year end.
Following Chambers at al. (2007), we mean-difference all independent variables within years to estimate fixed effects regressions. Table 2 suggest that our extended data are comparable to the data 1998-2003 used by Chambers et al. (2007) .
Results
Main results
[Insert Table 2 about here]
After validating our data, we next examine whether the results of Chambers et al. (2007) are driven by the self-selection bias as suggested by Rees and Shane (2012) and Bamber et al. (2010) . [Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 reports the results of the second-stage regression with IMR as in models 4
and 5. The results presented in Table 4 support those in Table 2 in that aggregate OCI and its components are value relevant only when reported in the SSE. In fact, we find that both the coefficients and statistical significance of the interaction terms between DSE and OCI (including aggregate OCI and its components) remain similar after controlling for IMR. This finding confirms that investors tend to limit their attention to OCI and its components only when they are reported in the location where they were predominantly reported prior to ASU 2011-05. The above finding, however, could be driven by the fact that only about 20% of our sample firms report OCI in the SCI during 1998-2006.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
To address the unbalanced sample issue, we perform the same tests for the period of 2010-2012 during which about 40% (60%) of the sample reported OCI in the SCI (the SSE). Table 1 , indicating that an unbalanced sample indeed could have biased our previous finding using data of 1998-2006. We further examine whether a more balanced sample from 2010-2012 would change our previous finding on how the markets price OCI.
[Insert Table 5 about here] reporting OCI in the SCI. We perform a difference-in-differences regression to further investigate this issue. As shown in model 6, our variable of interest is the three-way interaction term TREAT*POST*OCI. The coefficient on this term captures the differences in value relevance of OCI for the treatment and the control firms. Table 7 shows that POST*OCI is positive and significant at the 5% level (tstatistic = 2.29), indicating that overall investors value OCI more in the adoption period. [Insert Table 7 about here]
Additional analysis
A recent experimental study by Elliott et al. (2010) examines the joint influence of accounting transparency and investor base on analysts' expectation of mispricing of OCI. They find that analysts expect a larger overpricing when a firm reports its OCI more transparently (i.e., reporting OCI in the SCI rather than in the SSE) when the firm's most important investors are transient rather than dedicated investors.
Results from Elliott et al. (2010) indicate that analysts expect transient investors to overlook the transitory nature of OCI and to value OCI more when it is reported in a more transparent location. As a sensitivity test, we investigate whether investor base and reporting location jointly affect the value relevance of OCI. Compared to dedicated investors that have a long-term horizon and are geared up for long-term capital, transient investors more likely adjust their trading strategies based on near-term factors (Bushee, 2001; Elliott et al., 2010) . More specifically, we test whether OCI is more value relevant in the SCI than in the SSE when a firm's most important investors are transient institutions.
We perform our test using the following models: 
where TIH is the decile rank of percentage of transient institutional ownership. 10 The classification of transient investors is based on the one used in Bushee (2001) . 11 All the other variables are previously defined and summarized in Appendix A.
Results reported in Table 8 
Conclusion
This study examines whether switching the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI affects the value relevance of OCI and its components. Using manually collected data, we find that, upon the adoption period of ASU 2011-05, firms switching the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI experienced a significant reduction in the value relevance of OCI compared to firms that continued to report OCI in the same location. We also find that the market prices aggregate OCI only when it is reported in the SSE in both the pre ASU 2011 ASU -05 (1998 ASU -2006 and the adoption (2010-2012) periods.
Our results are robust after controlling for the potential sample selection bias. Examining whether investor base and the reporting location of OCI jointly affect the value relevance of OCI and its components, we find that OCI is more value relevant when reported in the SSE when the firm's most important investors are transient investors.
Our results suggest that although reporting OCI in the SCI, as required by ASU 2011-05, may have increased information transparency, investors continue perceiving OCI as a transitory item and valuing it only when it is reported in the SSE. This study provides evidence on how investors price OCI and its components when they are presented in different locations in financial statements and how investors respond to the switch of reporting OCI from SSE to SCI. Our findings are timely and should be of interest to regulators, researchers, practitioners and users of accounting information.
Our study is not without limitations. First, we do not rule out the possibility that investors value OCI only when it is reported in the SSE simply because the SSE has been its predominant reporting location. Investors are likely to grow accustomed to new reporting practices. Thus our results should be viewed as preliminary because our sample period ends in the first adoption year of ASU 2011-05 (i.e. 2012). Future research may extend the test period to include years following 2012. 12 Second, it is also possible that the models used in this study are not powerful enough to capture the effect of the change in OCI reporting location on the value relevance of OCI. Future research should continue investigating whether the change in OCI reporting location has any real effect on investors' and other financial statement users' decision making.
12 However, because SCI will eventually become the predominant location to report OCI in the post-ASU 2011-05 period, we caution that including years following 2012 with a vast majority of sample firms mandated to report OCI in the SCI may potentially bias the findings.
Appendix A Variable Definitions Variable Definitions
RET buy-and-hold raw return for the window eight months before to four months after the fiscal year end; NI the net income after extraordinary items and discontinued operations, scaled by the market value eight months before fiscal year end; LOSS a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a firm reports net loss, and 0 otherwise; OCI the value reported as ''other comprehensive income", scaled by the market value eight months before fiscal year end; DIS a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when OCI is reported in the SCI, and 0 otherwise; DSE a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when OCI is reported in the SSE, and 0 otherwise; TCurrency the unrealized gains and losses from foreign currency translation, scaled by the market value eight months before fiscal year end; TAFS the unrealized gains and losses from available-for-sale securities, scaled by the market value eight months before fiscal year end; TDerivatives the unrealized gains and losses from derivative securities and hedging activities, scaled by the market value eight months before fiscal year end; TPension the unrealized gains and losses from defined benefit plans, scaled by the market value eight months before fiscal year end; TOther the unrealized gains and losses resulting from other items, scaled by the market value eight months before fiscal year end; SIZE the log of the market value of the firm's common shares outstanding; LEVE long-term debt scaled by total assets; ROA net income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets. VOL_OCI the standard deviation of comprehensive income scaled by total assets, divided by the standard deviation of net income scaled by total assets, measured over the initial comprehensive income reporting year and the prior four years; Complexity_OCI the number of OCI components the firm reported on its10-K filing; Abs_TCurrency_OCI the ratio of absolute value of TCurrency over the sum of absolute values of OCI components; We use the sample for the period of 1998-2006 to replicate Chambers et al. (2007) and statistically evaluate whether the reporting location affects investors' pricing of OCI and its components. Prior to ASU 2011-05, SFAS 130 required firms to disclose OCI and its components in (1) a combined income statement that reports both the components and totals of net income and comprehensive income; (2) a separate comprehensive income statement that starts with net income, reports the components of OCI, and ends with comprehensive income (SCI); or (3) the statement of changes in equity (SSE). We estimate the association between OCI (and its components) and stock returns conditional on the reporting location of OCI. See Appendix A for variable definitions. The t-statistics are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust variance estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. In the first stage regression, we examine the determinants of reporting location using the variables similar to Bamber et al. (2010) . Specifically, we estimate a probit regression that models the choice of reporting location on the firm characteristics and the types and magnitudes of OCI. DIS is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm presents OCI in the SCI, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the log of the market value of the firm's common shares outstanding; ROA is net income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets; LEVE is long-term debt divided by total assets; VOL_OCI is the volatility of OCI relative to the volatility of NI, calculated as the standard deviation of comprehensive income scaled by total assets, divided by the standard deviation of net income scaled by total assets, over the initial comprehensive income reporting year and the prior four years; Complexity_OCI captures the complexity of OCI, defined as the number of OCI components the firm reports on its 10-K filing; Abs_TCurrency_OCI (Abs_TAFS_OCI, Abs_TDerivatives_OCI it , Abs_TPension_OCI it , and Abs_TOther_OCI) are the ratio of the absolute value of TCurrency (TAFS, TDerivatives, TPension, and TOther) over the sum of the absolute values of OCI components. This table reports the results of whether changing the reporting location of OCI affects the value relevance of OCI and its components. TREAT is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm changed the presentation of OCI from SSE to SCI (treatment firms), and 0 if the firm did not change the reporting location of OCI (control firms). For the treatment firms, POST is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the firm changed the reporting location, and 0 otherwise; for the control firms, it takes the value of 1 if the fiscal year begins after December 15, 2011, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. The t-statistics are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust variance estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
